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Abstract
The paper discusses efforts to understand the self-organisation and evolution of
language from a cognitive modeling point of view. It focuses in particular on efforts
that use connectionist components to synthesise some of the major stages in the
emergence of language and possible transitions between stages. The paper does not
introduce new technical results but discusses a number of dimensions for mapping
out the research landscape.
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1 Introduction
Understanding the origins and evolution of language and meaning is currently one of the
most stimulating areas of research in cognitive science. Because it is such a challenging
question that touches on all aspects of cognition, it stimulates creative thinking and helps
to consider many fundamental issues in a new light. Almost all subareas of cognitive
science are contributing: from anthropology and archeology to genetics, linguistics and
psychology. This paper focuses on contributions from the perspective of (connectionist)
cognitive modeling. It surveys some of the major issues related to the question what kind
of cognitive architectures individuals in a population need in order to see the emergence,
sustainance and evolution of language.
Most of the insights discussed in this article come from a trend, which started in the
early nineties [52], to use computer models and robotic experiments for testing theories
(see [12], [8] for collections of representative work and [69] for a recent survey). Many of
these models use at their core connectionist components, such as bi-directional associative
memories, radial basis function networks, recurrent neural networks, etc. The novelty
from a connectionist point of view lies not in the components themselves but rather in
how they are integrated in a more encompassing architecture and how they are used to
tackle aspects of social cognition, particularly how a group can arrive at a shared language
inventory and repertoire of concepts.
The paper first introduces the view of language as a complex adaptive system, which
has become the consensual view in the work surveyed here. Next a first axis for mapping
out the research landscape is introduced: a distinction between the sociobiological and the
sociocultural approach to the emergence of linguistic order and its increase in complexity.
Then a second axis is proposed, which is based on viewing communication in terms of the
transmission of information in the tradition of Shannon versus viewing communication
as requiring inference for conceptualisation and interpretation. Finally, possible stages in
the evolution from lexical to grammatical communication systems are proposed, which
provides a third axis for understanding ongoing work.
2 Language as a Complex Adaptive System
Linguistic Capacities and Inventories
There is obviously a distinction between the following three aspects of language:
1. The biological capacity for language (also known as the architecture of the language
faculty), which is the set of physiological and cognitive components that agents
need in order to enter and participate in a language community. For example,
speech requires a vocal tract with fine-grained motor control and auditory sensors
and associated rapid signal processing, a lexicon requires some sort of bi-directional
associative memory for storing and retrieving words, syntax requires the ability to
recognise and produce sequential patterns, etc.
2. The language inventory of an individual agent or ideolect, which is the body of
knowledge (sound system, individual lexicon, grammar) that an individual uses to
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map form to meaning and meaning to form. It contains for example a specific
inventory of sounds, a specific lexicon, a set of grammatical constructions, etc.
3. The communal language, which is the consensus that has arisen in a particular popu-
lation on how to express meanings. This is obviously emergent from the activities of
the individual agents and is not physically stored anywhere nor globally observable
by the individuals in the population.
It is clear that language undergoes change at each of these levels. The biological capac-
ity for language has somehow come into existence phylogenetically and is regenerated in
every individual ontogenetically as part of a developmental process. The language inven-
tory of an individual grows throughout childhood but then keeps changing as individuals
adapt their inventories to the needs and communities in which they find themselves by
a well documented alignment process [20]. The communal language is also constantly
changing. New sounds pop up in languages, sometimes driven by mere fashion, or new
aspects of sounds (like tones) may become exploited. New words enter all the time in
the lexicon and the meanings of existing words change. New grammatical constructions
enter and others disappear. These changes have been documented by historical linguists
[22] and there is now clear evidence from sociolinguistic research that the change is much
more rapid and ongoing than is usually assumed [27], particularly in multi-lingual set-
tings. The idealised notion of a ’static uniform target language’ has to be replaced by
the notion that language has lots of internal variation and should be viewed as a complex
adaptive system in constant flux [55]. As already argued by Hopper, grammar is forever
changing and emergent [23].
We can furthermore make a distinction between the concrete elements routinely used
in a language (the sound repertoire, the lexical items, the syntactic and semantic cat-
egories, the grammatical rules and constructions) and the meta-level structure of the
language (further called the meta-system) which constrains how a language can be ex-
panded if the need arises. This meta-system captures the sytematicity of the language.
For example, a language might use a case system with nominative, accusative, dative,
etc. and morphological case markings for the expression of event-argument structure of
verbs (as in German or Latin), but it might also use grammatical relations (subject, direct
object, indirect object) with word order and prepositions (as in English), or post-nominal
particles (as in Japanese) for the same purpose [4]. Even within one of these approaches,
there are still many further options, for example, a language might systematically adopt
a nominative-accusative distinction (as in German) or an ergative-absolutive one (as in
Basque). If a certain language has chosen one of these approaches and a new type of event
needs to be expressed, the grammar should be expanded in the same ’style’ as is already
dominant in the language in order to make it easier to memorise and infer by analogy the
intended meaning.
Just as we made a distinction between ideolect and communal language, a distinction
can be made between:
1. The individual meta-system, which is the meta-system that a single individual main-
tains for his own language.
2. The communal meta-system, which is the meta-system underlying a communal lan-
guage.
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The individual and communal meta-systems also appear to change continuously, just
as the language system itself, and these changes may be profound as they may lead to an
overhaul of global systemic principles. For example, new word classes may appear (like
articles which did not exist in Latin but then emerged in all derived Romance languages),
the expression of certain syntactic features may shift (like the expression of past tense
in English which shifted from morphological modulation (come/came, do/did, is/was) to
the use of the -ed morpheme (as in dance/danced)), or grammatical systems may change
(as happened in English which shifted from a case-marking system as in Latin to a word-
order+preposition based system for the expression of event-argument structure [66]). So
here again, we have to abandon the notion that there is a static meta-system in favor of
a complex adaptive systems view.
In contrast, some linguists believe that there is a single communal meta-system for
all human language communities consisting of a set of basic principles and parameters.
This universal meta-grammar is usually called Universal Grammar (UG) [14] and is not
assumed to undergo change. It then becomes conceivable to equate the universal meta-
system with a biologically determined language faculty. The meta-grammar of a particular
language (and the one known by an individual speaker of that language) then consists of
a particular setting of the parameters of UG, and these parameter settings do undergo
change [30].
In addition to linguistic capacities there are also the conceptual capabilities to produce
or interpret the semantic structures expressed by language. These conceptual capabilities
clearly also undergo change as well, and not just during childhood. As new tasks and
domains are tackled, new categories or conceptualisations become relevant and others
become obsolete. This expansion pushes the language to lexicalise or grammaticalise
new conceptualisations while the conventionalised expression of a conceptualisation in
turn helps to spread and maintain it in the population and helps individuals to align
their conceptual repertoires so that they become more similar [20], [60]. Although the
formation and coordination of new conceptualisations is crucial for understanding how
language itself is possible, we will not develop it in the present paper.
3 Sociobiological versus Sociocultural Explanations
Broadly speaking, three approaches are being explored for synthesising the origins and
evolution of linguistic structure: a sociobiological, a sociocultural, and a mixed biologi-
cal/cultural approach.
Sociobiological explanations
The first approach has been pioneered by Hurford [5], who introduced the term socio-
biological. In line with other nativist trends in linguistics [14], it relies on genetic coding
and natural selection, and is hence closely related to evolutionary psychology [45]. Para-
phrasing Hurford (o.c., p.194), the explanation structure of the sociobiological approach
can be summarised as follows:
1. Individuals who are more successful communicators enjoy a selective advantage and
are more likely to reproduce than individuals who are worse communicators.
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2. If an innate strategy X for communication is superior to other conceivable strategies,
its possessors tend to enjoy a reproductive advantage over others, thereby increasing
the prevalence of this strategy in the next generation.
3. Therefore over an evolutionary timespan, strategy X displaces all rivals, and ends
up being the strategy used for establishing and maintaining communication systems
in the group.
The term strategy is construed broadly. It can be a strategy for acquiring the lexicon
of a language, a strategy for using a particular word for expressing a certain meaning,
a strategy for exploiting a particular cognitive mechanism for language, a strategy for
using a certain grammatical construction, a meta-strategy for expanding the grammar of
a language in a particular way, etc.
Hurford first applied this line of thinking to investigate the optimal strategy for the
most basic stage of language in which agents name individual objects or situations. He
shows (further confirmed by [47]) that a Saussurean strategy in which the associations
between names and objects is bi-directional is optimal. Hence this strategy could in
principle have become genetically innate by natural selection, assuming a strong feedback
loop between communicative success and reproductive advantage.
The same line of argument can and has been applied for explaining other aspects of
language. For example, to explain compositionality, there could have been a competition
between individuals who use a compositional coding strategy and individuals who use
a holistic strategy (single word sentences coding complex meanings). Assuming that
a compositional coding strategy results in better communication systems and hence a
reproductive advantage for those using it, the genes coding for such a strategy would
progressively spread in the population so that it becomes part of the innate Language
Acquisition Device, and this could explain why human languages are compositional [41].
The sociobiological approach can also be used to explain the origins and structure of
communal languages, in which case the competing strategies are words or grammatical
constructions for expressing certain meanings. One of the earliest demonstrations of this
approach [72] uses a lexicon in the form of a bi-directional associative memory which is
genetically coded in the sense that the weights of associations between words and their
meanings is genetically inherited and changes to these weights arise by mutation and
recombination. A particular linguistic choice, i.e. to use a certain word for a certain
meaning, gives individuals in a particular population a reproductive advantage so that
the gene coding this choice spreads in the population. Eventually all agents share the
same winning genes and complete communicative success is reached. Several researchers
have further explored this line (see e.g. [29]), including for the genetic evolution of simple
grammars (see e.g. [12]).
Sociocultural explanations
The second approach is sociocultural. Its explanation structure is as follows:
1. Given a population where individuals have several possible strategies for negotiating
and using communication systems.
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2. Some strategies might be more effective than others and this impacts the expressive
power of the language, the success that agents have in communication, and/or the
effort that they require.
3. Agents try to maximise expressive power, optimize communicative success and min-
imise effort by choosing the most adapted strategy, therefore, over a cultural time-
span, this strategy displaces all rivals, and ends up being the strategy by which
communication systems are, at least temporarily, established and maintained in
that specific population.
So there are two key differences between sociobiological and sociocultural models: (1)
In a sociocultural model, selection does not go through fitness, reproductive success,
and genetic coding, but through cultural choice and direct feedback on success or effort
in communication, and (2) the creation of variation and new structure is not based on
genetic mutation or recombination but on the invention and use of linguistic structure
and its partial (possibly slightly differing) adoption by others.
This sociocultural explanation structure can be applied in a straightforward manner
to tackle the origin of specific ideolects and communal languages. Choice for one strategy
versus another (e.g. which word will be used to express a certain meaning or which
grammatical construction will be used) is now not only based on effort or expressive
power, but also on which choice is most frequent in the population as this determines
the potential for success. Already from the mid-nineties (see e.g. [24], [50]) simulations
started to appear which showed that the principle of self-organisation is effective to get
a population to agree on a shared lexicon. Again, a bi-directional associative memory
was used for the lexicon, but now the weights change based on success and failure in the
communication and they are not genetically inherited. When agents choose the word-
meaning pairs that had most success in the past, successful words will be used more and
thus the positive feedback loop required for self-organisation is achieved. Lateral inhibition
after a successful game and damping after an unsuccessful game have proven to be the
most optimal strategy [43]. Very soon examples were shown where agents negotiated
grammars using very similar mechanisms [1], [54]. The sociocultural approach could also
be demonstrated for the evolution of perceptually grounded categories in co-evolution
with a lexicon [60] and for the emergence of sound repertoires [?].
All these are examples where a communal language self-organises and continues to
adapt under the forces of maximising communicative success and expressive power while
minimising effort. But the same explanation structure has also been used with respect to
the choice for a particular strategy. Thus whereas Nowak and collaborators [41] showed
how the choice of holistic versus compositional coding could be the outcome of a socio-
biological process in which the more optimal strategy becomes innate, the simulations
reported by Kirby and collaborators [6], show that this choice need not be based on fit-
ness of the individuals (as would be the case in a sociobiological model) but on the impact
of the transmission bottleneck which brings a population towards choosing and sustaining
a compositional strategy. In other words, the cognitive architecture of the agents sup-
ports a choice between compositional and non-compositional coding and agents choose for
the compositional strategy. Another example of research along these lines is reported in
[68]. It compares different strategies for grounded lexicon acquisition and shows that joint
attention and corrective feedback are a better strategy than non-social forms of learning.
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It is perhaps less obvious how to apply a sociocultural approach to explain the origins
of the language faculty. If there is a single universal meta-system for language, it is
conceivable that this system is biologically embodied as a highly specialised genetically
determined ’language organ’, as indeed some linguists have argued [14], [45] (figure 1
left). In that case the universal meta-grammar and the biologically acquired language
faculty are two sides of the same coin and a sociobiological approach is the most logical
explanation.
On the other hand, if the meta-systems of human languages undergo change, including
true innovation, then a sociobiological explanation becomes less likely (or at least no
longer necessary and sufficient), and a population can be seen as selecting from the set of
all possible physiological and cognitive mechanisms normally available to human beings
those that are adequate for supporting a specific way of creating a language. As many
alternatives are possible, there is no longer a universally shared, genetically determined
language organ but each language exploits different constellations of biological capacities
(figure 1 right). A trivial example is the difference between a speech-based and a gesture-
based language (i.e. a sign language). The first type has recruited vocal articulatory
and auditory embodiments and processing whereas the second type has recruited bodily
gestures and visual recognition. Another example is the difference between languages
which almost exclusively rely on morphosyntax (as Australian Aboriginal languages [16])
and those almost exclusively relying on sequential ordering (as English). Quite different
processing and learning mechanisms are involved in one or the other. There may even
be differences among the individuals within the same language community, which would
make the use of that language more robust. Like an amoeba, the required biological basis
for a specific language adapts to exploit the available neural structures, even shifting from
one hemisphere to another one if damage comes early enough [63].
Figure 1: Two views on the relation between biological capacities and language. In the
’language instinct’ view (left) highly specialised and genetically determined components
make up the language faculty. In a cultural view (right), a particular language uses a
particular constellation of generically available biological capacities.
Combining biological and cultural approaches
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There are obvious parallels and interactions between sociobiological and sociocultural
approaches. In fact, there are few researchers who believe that all of language has resulted
from sociobiological evolution or alternatively that all of language has a sociocultural
foundation. The selection criteria that are used in sociobiological explanations are often
relevant to sociocultural explanations, and vice-versa. It is only the way these criteria
are assumed to impact the evolving communication system that is different. Thus, if a
particular style of grammar (say one exploiting word order instead of morphosyntax) is
more effective for a population, sociobiologists would argue that this style becomes innate
due to the reproductive success agents enjoy, whereas socioculturalists would argue that
it is a (temporal) cultural consensus due to self-organisation.
Some experiments have studied the interaction between the two, i.e. how certain
strategies, which have evolved in a sociocultural fashion, can become genetically engrained
due to the Baldwin effect [37], [9]. This requires however that there is first a sociocultural
evolution leading to sufficiently stable choices so that genetic evolution can catch up with
them.
4 Signalling Systems versus Language Games
A second axis to structure research activities is orthogonal to the sociobiological/ socio-
cultural distinction and related to how communication itself is viewed, namely as pure
information transmission or as inferential [49].
Following Tomasello [65], we define communication as an action whereby the speaker
attempts to draw the listener’s attention to some aspect of the world: an object, a situa-
tion, an action, a property or relation, etc. This is typically done to achieve a cooperative
action in the world, but usually the desired action must be inferred. For example, the
speaker could draw the attention of the hearer to an object with the implicit assumption
that the hearer then hands the object to the speaker, or the speaker could draw attention
to a potential action which he wants the hearer to perform. Speaker and hearer are con-
sidered to be able, directly or indirectly, to determine whether the communication was
successful, for example because the hearer performs a consequential action. All this is
already true for alarm calls: The animal emitting the call does not communicate whether
and how to flee from a predator but draws attention to a predator of a particular kind,
and he or she can afterwards easily observe whether his or her call had the desired effect.
In most cases, communication is not a one-step interaction but participants repair each
other’s understanding by additional communications and actions. Note that a distinction
must be made between pragmatic feedback, coming from subsequent action, and linguistic
feedback, where agents directly correct each others’ communications.
The first way in which evolution of communication systems can now be studied is
within the tradition of Shannon’s information theory. The information to be expressed
(the message) is given in one way or another (for example as output of a perceptual sys-
tem), and the task is to code and decode that information as efficiently and reliably as
possible in terms of signals. A lot of simulation studies within this framework hence start
from a set of possible messages and let agents evolve message-signal matrices (see e.g.
[29]), possibly using syntactic structure to make the transmision more reliable or more
compact or easier to learn (see e.g. [41]). The criterion for success in communication is
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whether the information decoded from the signal by the receiver is identical to the in-
formation coded by the sender. Many simulations take a short-cut and compare directly
the matrices developed by agents to compute the probability whether their communica-
tions are going to be successful [40]. This probability is then directly used to estimate
the fitness of the agent in sociobiological models, thus avoiding the need for multi-agent
simulations. The signalling viewpoint is most often adopted by those coming from the
perspective of animal communication.
The second viewpoint is embedded in the tradition of philosophical investigations of
communication [49] as well as cognitive linguistics [28] and emphasises the inferential
nature of human communication. It is most often adopted by those with an interest
in understanding the origins and evolution of human natural languages. The inferential
approach starts from situated embodied interactions, often called language games. The
interaction takes place in a shared setting in which the speaker wants to draw the attention
of the hearer to some aspect of the world and thus invoke a possible action. The interaction
requires two types of activities: (1) The speaker needs to conceptualise the world in a way
that a distinctive description is found of the topic he wants to draw attention to. This is
usually called the discrimination task. The hearer needs to use this distinctive description
to determine what aspect of the world the hearer wants to draw attention to. This is the
interpretation task. (2) The speaker needs to evoke the conceptualisation in the hearer
by choosing a number of conventionalised symbols (this task is usually called production)
and the hearer must use these symbols to reconstruct the intended conceptualisation
(usually called parsing). A communication now succeeds when the hearer pays attention
to the aspect of the world that the hearer originally has chosen, which is observable by the
speaker through the hearer’s subsequent action or to the hearer by corrections or repairs
initiated by the speaker after his action.
A complete language game then combines these various steps is shown in figure 2.
As a side effect of playing a game, speaker and hearer may expand their language or
conceptual inventories, change weights to reflect usage frequencies, switch strategy, or
recruit new types of cognitive processes, all aimed to achieve communicative success,
maximise expressive power and minimise the effort involved in communication.
Figure 2: A language game requires discrimination and interpretation as well as produc-
tion and parsing.
There are some important differences between inferential communication and infor-
mation transmission. The first one is that speaker and hearer do not necessarily have to
have the same meaning in order for the communication to succeed. Suppose there is a
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small red ball and a big blue pyramid and the speaker says ”bobado” to refer to the first
object, with ”bobado” meaning ‘small’. Suppose the hearer parses ”bobado” as meaning
‘red’. Despite differences in meaning, the communication is still successful. Speaker and
hearer will not even be aware that they used different meanings. If they live in a world
where balls are always red and small, and where there are no other objects that are red
or small except balls, then they will always succeed.
Second, the speaker’s conceptualisation of the situation should be seen as a hint rather
than a completely reliable specification, which is indeed what makes the communication
inferential. Context and world knowledge has to be used to reconstruct the potential
meanings or interpret them. This is the reason why natural language can tolerate am-
biguity and why communication can be robust despite a very unreliable medium and
divergent perception for the participants in the communication.
A third difference is that the inventories of agents do not need to be identical to
have successful communication. It is enough that they are sufficiently coordinated to
have successful communication within the environments that the agents find themselves.
Indeed, given that lexicons, grammars and conceptual inventories are a function of the
individual history of situated interactions with others, it would be very surprising if they
are absolutely identical. Careful observations of human categories or naming behavior
shows tremendous individual variation [70] and rapid alignment [20].
All this implies that it is no longer possible to simply compare coded and decoded
meaning to determine communicative success, or compare the inventories of agents to
determine the probability of their success in communication, as is done in signalling
experiments, instead multi-agent simulations now become necessary, particularly if the
environment is open-ended. Pragmatic feedback must be integrated in the interaction to
determine communicative success.
5 Stages and Prerequisites for Communication Sys-
tems
We have already discussed two axes for structuring research in the origins and evolu-
tion of languagelike communication systems: the sociocultural/sociobiological axis which
concerns the nature of the mechanisms responsable for the origin and propagation of lin-
guistic structure, and the transmission/inferential communication axis which concerns the
nature of the communication. We now turn to another axis for mapping out the research
landscape, which is related to the complexity of both the meanings and the forms (or
signals) used by the agents.
From a research point of view, it is obviously extremely useful to identify a set of
evolutionary stages or milestones with respect to human language, because then simpler
forms of language could be studied before tackling more complex ones and we could
investigate transitions between stages. This approach is similar to current research in
biology on the ’minimal cell’ [31], and on transitions that would transform such a cell or
collections of cells into more complex life forms [34]. From an engineering point of view, a
division into stages is useful as well, because we can then already build applications with
simpler systems without having to tackle the full complexity of human language.
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It is not so obvious to identify different stages in the complexity of human-like com-
munication, and there is definitely no consensus about it. All human languages are known
to have a similar level of complexity and expressive power, so different stages are not so
easily observable as in biological species. Bickerton [3] has proposed that there are two
stages: a lexical stage, which he calls proto-language, similar to the language of 2-year
olds or pidgins spoken in trading contexts, and a grammatical stage, which has the com-
plexity of full human language. Jackendoff [25] paints a more complex picture with a
dozen different stages. He includes for example a step in which a system of grammatical
relationships conveys a set of semantic relations, a stage in which there is the emergence
of a system of inflections, and so on. Jackendoff’s stages are motivated by fossils that he
identifies in existing human languages.
We consider in this paper an alternative set of seven stages, specifically motivated by
research into the cognitive architecture and self-organisation of communication systems
in embodied agents. Each stage is characterised by a particular level of complexity at
the language side and a particular level of expressive power at the meaning side. Each
stage is assumed to build further on the cognitive capacities achieved at earlier stages
and requires a major ’breakthrough’ or transition. The stages proposed here do not
necessarily correspond to historical stages in human language evolution or child language
acquisition but are considered to be useful plateaus for structuring the investigation and
the engineering of embodied communicating agents.
To achieve even a minimal form of communication (particularly from the viewpoint of
inferential communication), a number of prerequisites need to be satisfied:
1. The agents that will be involved in the communication need to be engaged in a coop-
erative task which usually implies that they are situated in the same environment
to which they have access through their sensori-motor system. The environment
and agent activities generate shared cooperative goals.
2. The agents need to have a medium in which signs can be constructed, i.e. a reper-
toire of sounds or gestures that they can mutually recognise and reproduce.
3. Agents need to be able to engage in turn-taking behavior. One needs to recognise
that the other one wants to engage in communication and then they could both
start a routinised series of interactions.
4. Agents need to be able to share attention, even without communication. Shared
attention can be achieved in many ways: by pointing, by eye gaze following, by
bodily movements, by recognising actions of the speaker and predicting what he
will do next, etc. Shared attention is necessary to drastically restrict the set of
possible aspects of the world the speaker may draw attention to and to guess the
set of possible meanings used by the speaker in case the listener does not know the
conventions that were used.
Clearly each of these prerequisites is highly challenging and profound work has been going
on in many corners of cognitive science to understand them. But this will however not
be discussed further in this paper.
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6 Stages in Lexical Communication Systems
The first three stages concern lexical communication systems because they use individual
meaning-carrying units without syntax:
Stage Meaning Form Breakthrough
Stage I Individuals (proper) Names Convergence on convention
Stage II Single Categories Single Words Co-evolution language/meaning
Stage III Multiple Categories Multiple Words Compositionality
I The Naming Game
In stage I, the meaning M consists of an individual object and the utterance S to a
single word or sign naming this object. This corresponds to proper names in natural
language, such as ”John” refering to the unique object named John. Language games at
this stage are also known as Naming Games. The major breakthrough required is that
the population is able to negotiate a shared set of linguistic conventions.
There are three types of functions that agents need to build up and maintain a lexicon
of form-meaning pairs in order to reach shared conventions:
Invention When a new name is needed, the speaker should be able to generate a new word
from scratch and associate that in his memory with the object he wants to draw
attention to.
Adoption When the hearer encounters a new name and is able to guess the referent after
additional interaction or joint attention, he should be able to associate this new
word in his memory with the object.
Alignment Agents should update the strength of their association based on success in the
game. When a particular association was successful, the strength is increased and
that of competitors decreased (lateral inhibition). When an association was not
successful its strength is decreased (damping). This implements a reinforcement
learning approach which has been widely studied in the connectionist literature.
There is already a well-established literature on the Naming Game (starting from
[50], [43]) and many computer simulations have shown beyond doubt that the lateral
inhibition dynamics is effective (see for example figure 3 from [61]). Although the cognitive
architecture of agents at this stage appears relatively straightforward, it is far from trivial
to show in a theoretical way that a shared vocabulary emerges in the population given
a particular set of microscopic behaviors. Progress is being made using techniques from
complex systems science but theoretical proofs are still forthcoming. The question is
similar to multi-agent decision problems in economics (for example the opinion dynamics
discussed in [71]) or more generally, the emergence of global coordinated state based on
local interactions as studied in statistical physics.
Many of the computational components required for stage I can be easily implemented
using neural networks. For example, agents could use a classical feed forward neural
network with a winner-take-all strategy for object recognition (for the discrimination
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Figure 3: The graph plots the frequence with which a certain word is used for expressing
a particular meaning. There is a winner-take-all effect due to self-organisation.
game). The associative memory for the lexicon is also relatively easy to implement in
neural networks, for example using a bidirectional associative memory ([26]) which is itself
an extension of the Hopfield network. The strength of associations is then implemented
as weights of relations in the network and a winner-take-all process decides which name
to use for a given object and which object to use for a given name. Instead of using only
Hebbian learning, lateral inhibition has to be added as pioneered in Kohonen networks.
II. Coordinating Categories through Names
In Stage II, the meanings M consist of a single category that identifies an individual
object in a particular context. The utterance S names such a category. This corresponds
to the use of words like “table” or “red” to refer to a table or a red object. To reach this
stage, agents must be able to categorise objects in order to find a discriminative category,
to identify an object based on being given a discriminating category, and to build up
a repertoire of such categories, adequate for playing discrimination and interpretation
games. To do this, three functions are required:
Invention When a new category is needed by the speaker (because no distinctive categories
exist to discriminate the referent from other objects in the context), he should be
able to generate a new category and add it to the repertoire.
Adoption When a new category is needed by the hearer (because the language game failed
and the hearer should be able to generate a new category using the same or similar
mechanisms as the speaker.
Alignment Agents keep track of the success of their categories in the language game and prefer
those that have been shown to be successful in the past.
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To express these categories, agents must maintain a two-way associative memory similar to
Stage I. Instead of associating names to uniquely identified objects, agents now associate
words (or signs) to categories.
Computational mechanisms capable to achieve these functions have been demonstrated
and studied since the mid-nineties. Many possible ways exist to implement category
formation for discrimination and interpretation, ranging from neural network (e.g. using
radial basis function networks [60]) to symbolic approaches (e.g. discrimination trees [51]
or prototypes [62]). It has also been demonstrated that output of discrimination can be
fed into coding processes of the same sort as used in the Naming Game (Stage I) and
that the same sort of decoding processes as in Stage I can be used. Moreover by the
proper coupling of the two games, it has been shown that agents are able to coordinate
their repertoires of perceptually grounded categories, even if these categories were not
given innately nor centrally coordinated. The coordination takes place entirely through
language (see figure 4 taken from [60]). So implementing embodied communicating agents
for Stage II is at the moment well mastered and can already be the basis of non-trivial
applications.
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Figure 4: The graph plots the cumulative category variance between the ontologies in a
population of agents with and without language. Agents play discrimination and inter-
pretation games and construct an ontology as a side effect. When there is no coordination
through language, the ontologies do not converge, otherwise they do.
III. Compositionality
A communication system is compositional if an utterance can contain several parts
(signals or words) and the meaning of the total is a combination of the meanings of the
parts. The simplest form of compositionality is one where a sentence has multiple words
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and each word expresses a category or combination of categories. So this stage is quite
naturally triggered by a need to express multiple categories which arises when the domain
of discourse has sufficient structure so that categorisation in multiple conceptual spaces
is more efficient than categorisation in a single space. Although the need to express
multiple categories (such as ‘small’, ‘red’ and ‘ball’) introduces the potential for using
multiple words, and thus a compositional coding, that is not necessarily so. It is also
possible to use the same strategy as in stage II and use holistic coding. For example, a
single word to express the conjunction ‘small’, ‘red’, ‘ball’ could be chosen as opposed to
three different words.
To reach this stage, agents require more complex computational mechanisms that are
able to cover a set of categories using one or more words, or to reconstruct a combination of
categories using multiple words. The semiotic dynamics becomes more complex compared
to stage II, as different solutions, some more holistic and others more compositional,
compete for dominance in the population [67]. It has been shown that a strategy of using
multiple words is beneficial (in the sense that it leads to higher communicative success and
less effort) when the domain of discourse has enough regular structure [36]. As mentioned
earlier, some researchers have focused on the issue how compositional systems might come
to dominate in order to overcome the learning bottleneck [6].
7 Stages in Grammatical Communication
The three stages discussed so far all concern lexical languages, without any form of syntax.
The mechanisms needed for conceptualisation/interpretation and for parsing/production
at each of these stages are now reasonably well understood. There is not a single solution
but multiple strategies are possible, particularly for concept acquisition. Research beyond
these stages is less advanced, although progress clearly has been made and important
breakthroughs can be expected the coming years.
The first question is why a communication system would emerge that exploits syntax.
Opinion differs whether one takes a Shannon-style information theoretic view or whether
one adopts an inferential view of communication. In the first view, syntax arises to opti-
mise transmission. Indeed, if sender and receiver agree on the use of syntactic structure
then they have to transmit less information in the message themselves. The transmission
can become more compact and more reliable. This argument has been made by several
researchers [41], [19] using mathematical proofs and computer simulations. Another ar-
gument, but still from an information-theoretic view, focuses on the learning bottleneck,
caused by a lack of learning data for a new generation of learners and generally accepted
in linguistics as a ‘poverty of the stimulus’. If there is such a learning bottleneck, then
a communication system with syntax is more beneficial because it can be learned more
reliably with fewer data [6], [39].
The inferential view on communication and the language game framework that ex-
plores it, is proposing a quite different hypothesis concerning the nature and origin of
grammar, namely that it arises from the need to make the conceptualisation process
richer and the interpretation process more reliable [59]. This line adopts the ‘cognitive
linguistics’ view that syntax is not arbitrary or a mere structuring device but rather that
it carries meaning, i.e. that syntax becomes grammar in the sense of a carrier of meaning
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(see figure 5). Consider for example the multi-word sentence, “red ball under small box”.
Let us assume that there is no syntax yet, so the sentence is equivalent to ”under ball
box red small” or ”small box ball red under”. Based on the meaning of the words only,
the sentence conveys that there is a ball, that there is something red, that there is a box,
that there is a spatial relation between two objects, etc. This translates to the following
predicate-calculus expression (with question marks indicating the variables):
red(?x), ball(?y), under(?a,?b), small(?c), box(?d)
Without syntax, the speaker does not communicate that “red” and “ball” are about the
same object (i.e. that ?x and ?y are to be bound to the same object), that “small” and
“box” are both about another one (i.e. that ?c = ?d), and that the ball is under the
box and not the box under the ball (i.e. that ?x = ?a and ?b = ?c). By conveying this
additional information through syntax, the speaker would not only avoid misinterpreta-
tions but also reduce the computational complexity of the semantic interpretation process,
which is exponential w.r.t. the number of variables. One way to link different lexical items
and their meanings is by combining words into patterns. Thus the co-occurrence of “red
ball” can be taken to mean that red and ball are about the same object and should there-
fore be decoded as ‘red(?x), ball(?x)’. There are other syntactic means that could be used,
for example both words could be tagged with an additional affix specifying that they are
about the same thing, as in “red-ba ball-ba”, giving rise to a kind of morpho-syntax.
Research to explore the origins of grammar from the viewpoint of optimising inferential
communciation is stil in its infancy. It appears useful to distinguish four different stages:
Stage Meaning Breakthrough
Stage IV Multiple Objects + Predicates Constructions
Stage V id. Meta-grammar
Stage VI Second Order predicates Second order expression
Stage VII Meta-level Level formation
Stage IV involves the use of syntactic patterns for linking meanings of individual
words. In order to achieve it, agents need considerably more complex cognitive functions
compared to lexical stages: They need to be able to detect the need for the introduction of
syntax or be able to interpret a sentence even if no syntactic information is available. They
need to be able to recognise and reproduce the syntactic or morpho-syntactic patterns
that are used in a particular language, and invent syntactic conventions or adopt them
from others. The same alignment dynamics as in earlier stages is required to align the
different syntactic conventions that agents invent, so that the population converges on a
shared syntax.
The first significant experiments at this stage were carried out by Batali [1] who con-
structed a simulation where agents are capable to construct sequential patterns that link
a set of predicate-argument structures and are able to combine patterns by an appropriate
mapping of the variables. Batali used an exemplar-based learning technique for retriev-
ing form-meaning associations that most closely match the meaning to be expressed (in
production) or the form (in parsing). The same sort of reinforcement learning is used
as earlier discussed for Stage I. Agents align patterns because they tend to use the ones
which occur most frequently in the population. Batali used symbolic representations and
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learning and implementing them in a realistic neural embodiment is much more difficult.
There are various types of networks (such as recurrent neural networks [18]) which are
able to learn syntactic patterns and they are therefore a potential basis for implementing
these experiments as well.
Stage V moves from the ad hoc use of syntactic patterns to more systematicity, through
an intermediary layer of syntactic and semantic categories intervening between form and
meaning, so that the linking takes place at a more abstract level and the communica-
tion system becomes much more regular in structure. This is indeed what human natural
languages do. Typical examples of syntactic categories are noun, verb, nominative, mascu-
line, past, perfect, etc. They are syntactically marked with word order, affixes, intonation,
stress, etc. and are used to define or recognise abstract syntactic patterns like SVO. Typ-
ical examples of semantic categories are agent, beneficiary, source, cause-transfer, state,
etc. They are used to define or recognise semantic frames which reconceptualise meanings
in a more abstract way. Grammatical constructions then link semantic frames to syntac-
tic patterns. For example, the Cause-transfer links a semantic frame involving an agent,
patient and target to a syntactic SVOtoO pattern (subject-verb-directobject-to-object,)
[21] (see figure 5). A specific verb, like slides, is an instantiation of this construction.
Figure 5: A construction relates a syntactic pattern such as Sub-
ject+Predicate+DirectObject+PrepObject with a semantic frame such as TRANSFER-
TO-TARGET+Agent+Patient+Target.
The introduction of an additional layer requires a more sophisticated computational
framework to implement grammatical constructions and the syntactic and semantic cat-
egorisations that they require. The meta-grammar has to become explicit as well so that
the adoption and expansion of syntactic form to reflect new syntactic categories is system-
atised. At the moment there is growing research into the computational implementation
of construction grammars [2], [11], [58], some of it with neural inspiration [17], and on
the acquisition and invention of constructions [13] strongly inspired by research on child
language acquisition [10] and research in grammaticalisation phenomena [22]. All this
work currently forms the basis of the first construction grammar based experiments in
grammar emergence (such as [58]) but much remains to be done.
There are still two further stages that can be identified compared to human natural
languages: Stage VI is triggered when the need arises to include predicates that modify
other predicates, i.e. second order (or even higher order) predicates. For example the
adverb “very” in “very big ball” is modifying the category expressed by the adjective
“big”. It is not a predicate that ranges over objects in the domain of discourse directly.
The known arsenal of logical operators, quantifiers and connectives now becomes part of
the expressive power of possible semantic structures. When this higher order usage of
predicates needs to be communicated explicitly, it is an additional reason why grammar
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becomes crucial and necessary. Although there is significant amount of research in (log-
ical) semantics and linguistics beyond first order logic (see e.g. research into Montague
Grammar [44]) there are so far no computationally tested theories how such second order
predicates could arise nor how the grammar could arise to express them.
Finally Stage VII arises when a language becomes its own meta-language, i.e. when
it becomes possible to state information about meaning or structure in terms of the
language itself, and thus allow for a much more rapid cultural spreading. To implement
the necessary computational functions for the latter stages in realistic neural networks
appears at the moment quite beyond the state of the art.
8 Conclusions
This paper discussed a number of issues that have come up in attempts to synthesise how
a population of agents might arrive at a shared communication system with properties
that are similar to human languages. We first identified the main linguistic and con-
ceptual aspects that need to be tackled and the distinction between sociobiological and
sociocultural approaches for the synthesis of structure and the transition between stages.
An orthogonal distinction was also made between signalling and inferential communica-
tion which leads to different types of experiments and sources of explanation. Next we
looked at a number of possible stages. Each stage is characterised by a particular level of
complexity at the meaning side and a particular level of complexity at the form side. Each
stage also requires an increased set of more complex strategies for playing discrimination
and interpretation games, including the formation of the ontologies required to play those
games, as well as more powerful strategies for communicating these meanings in coding
and decoding. Although there are quite solid results for the first stages, much remains
to be done for reaching the higher stages, particularly when a system of syntactic and
semantic categories underlies the mapping from meaning to form as is clearly the case in
natural languages.
9 Acknowledgement
This research has been partly supported by the ECAgents project funded by the Future
and Emerging Technologies program (IST-FET) of the European Commission under the
EU RD contract IST-1940. The information provided is the sole responsibility of the
authors and does not reflect the Commission’s opinion. The Commission is not responsible
for any use that may be made of data appearing in this publication.
References
[1] Batali, J. (2002) The Negotiation and Acquisition of Recursive Grammars as a Result
of Competition Among Exemplars. In: [8] p. 111-172.
[2] Bergen, B.K. and N.C. Chang. 2003. Embodied Construction Grammar in Simulation-
Based Language Understanding. TR 02-004, ICSI, Berkeley.
18
[3] Bickerton, D. (1990) Language and Species. University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
[4] Blake, B.J. (1994) Case. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
[5] Hurford, J. (1989) Biological evolution of the Saussurean sign as a component of the
language acquisition device. Lingua, 77(2):187–222.
[6] Brighton, H. and S. Kirby (2001) The survival of the smallest: stability conditions
for the cultural evolution of compositional language. In J. Kelemen and P. Sosik (Eds.)
Advances in Artificial Life. pp592–601 Berlin: Springer-Verlag
[7] de Boer, B. (2000) Self organization in vowel systems. Journal of Phonetics 28 (4),
pp. 441465
[8] Briscoe, T. (ed.) Linguistic Evolution through Language Acquisition: Formal and
Computational Models. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK.
[9] Briscoe, T. (2002) Grammatical Acquisition and Linguistic Selection. In: [8] p. 255-
300.
[10] Brooks, P. and M. Tomasello (1999) How children constrain their argument structure
constructions. Language, 75(4), pp. 720-738.
[11] Bryant, J. (2004) Scalable Construction-Based Parsing and Semantic Analysis. In
Proceedings of the Second International Workshop on Scalable Natural Language Un-
derstanding. Boston 2004
[12] Cangelosi, A. and D. Parisi (eds.) (2001) Simulating the Evolution of Language.
Springer-Verlag, Berlin.
[13] Chang, N.C. and T.V. Maia. (2003) Learning Grammatical Constructions In Pro-
ceedings of 2001 AAAI Symposium on Learning Grounded Representations.
[14] Chomsky, N. (1981) Lectures on Government and Binding. Foris, Dordrecht, 1981.
[15] Deacon, T. (1997) The Symbolic Species: The Co-Evolution of Language and the
Brain W. W. Norton and Co: New York and London.
[16] Dixon, R. (1996) Australian languages. Cambridge Language Surveys. Cambridge
UK.
[17] Dominey, P. (2003) Learning Grammatical Constructions in a Miniature Language
from Narrated Video Events. Proceedings 25th Annual meeting of the Cognitive Society,
Boston.
[18] Elman, J. (1991) Distributed representations, simple recurrent networks, and gram-
matical structure. Machine Learning, 7(2/3):195–226, 1991.
[19] Ferrer-i-Cancho, R. and Sole, R. V. (2003) Least effort and the origins of scaling in
human language. PNAS, 100:788–791.
19
[20] Garrod, S., and Anderson, A. (1987) Saying what you mean in dialogue: A study in
conceptual and semantic co-ordination. Cognition, 27, 181-218.
[21] Goldberg, A.E. (1995) Constructions.: A Construction Grammar Approach to Ar-
gument Structure. University of Chicago Press, Chicago
[22] Heine, (1997) The cognitive foundations of grammar. Oxford University Press, Ox-
ford.
[23] Hopper, (1991) Emergent Grammar. In: Traugott, E. and Heine, B. (1991) Ap-
proaches to Grammaticalization. Volume I and II. John Benjamins Publishing Com-
pany, Amsterdam, 1991.
[24] Hutchins, E. and B. Hazlehurst (1995) How to invent a lexicon: The development
of shared symbols in interaction. In N. Gilbert and R. Conte (eds.) Artificial societies:
The computer simulation of social life (p. 157-189). UCL Press, London.
[25] Jackendoff, R. (1999) Possible Stages in the Evolution of the Language Capacity.
Trends in Cognitive Science. Vol 3. 7. p. 272-279.
[26] Kosko, B. (1988) Bidirectional Associative Memories. IEEE Transactions on Systems,
Man, and Cybernetics, 18, pp. 49-60, 1988
[27] Labov, W. (1994) Principles of Linguistic Change. Volume 1: Internal Factors. Ox-
ford: Basil Blackwell, 1994,
[28] Langacker, R.W. (1991) Foundations of cognitive grammar. Stanford University
Press, Stanford Ca.
[29] Levin, M. (1995) The evolution of understanding: A genetic algorithm model of the
evolution of communication. Biosystems. Vol 36. p. 167-178.
[30] Lightfoot, David W. 1991. How to set parameters: Arguments from language change.
Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
[31] Luisi,, P.L. T. Oberholzer Origin of life on Earth: Molecular Biology as an Approach
to the Minimal Cell In: The Bridge between the Big Bang and Biology, F. Giovanelli
(ed.), CNR Pres., 345-355 2001
[32] von der Malsburg, C. (1995) Binding in Models of Perception and Brain Function.
Current Opinion in Neurobiology 5:pp.520-526
[33] Marr, D. (1982) Vision. Freeman Publishers, San Francisco.
[34] Maynard Smith, J. and E. Szathmary (1995) The major transitions in evolution. W.
H. Freeman, San Francisco
[35] Mufwene, S. (2001) Competition and Selection in Language Evolution. Selection 3
(2002) 1, 4556
20
[36] Neubauer, N. (2003) Emergence in a multiagent simulation of communicative be-
havior. PICS, Publication Series of the Institute of Cognitive Science, vol. 11, 2004,
Department of Cognitive Science, University of Osnabrck.
[37] Munroe, S. and Cangelosi, A. (2002) Learning and the evolution of language: The role
of cultural variation and learning costs in the Baldwin Effect. Artificial Life, 8(4):311–
339.
[38] Niyogi, P. and Berwick, R. C. (1995) The Logical Problem of Language Change.
Technical report, AI Lab, MIT
[39] P. Nyogi, R. Berwick, Evolutionary consequences of language learning. Linguistics
and Philosophy 20, 697-719. (1997).
[40] Nowak, M.A. and D.C. Krakauer (1999) The evolution of language.
Proc.Natl.Acad.Scie. USA. Vol 96, pp. 8028-8033, July 1999.
[41] Nowak, M.A., J.B. Plotkin, and V. Jansen (2000) The Evolution of Syntactic Com-
munication. Nature (404), p. 495-498.
[42] Nowak, M. A., N.L Komarova and P. Niyogi. (2001). Evolution of Universal Gram-
mar. Science. 291: 114-117
[43] Oliphant, M. (1997) Communication as altruistic behavior. Ph.D. Dissertation.
UCSD, San Diego.
[44] Partee, Barbara H. (2003) Compositionality in Formal Semantics: Selected Papers
of Barbara Partee . Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
[45] Pinker, S. (1994) The Language Instinct. Penguin Books. London.
[46] Prigogine, I. and G. Nicolis (1977) Self-Organization in Non-Equilibrium Systems:
From Dissipative Structures to Order Through Fluctuations J. Wiley and Sons, New
York 1977
[47] Smith, K. (2002). The cultural evolution of communication in a population of neural
networks. Connection Science 14(1), p65-8
[48] Smith, K., Kirby, S., and Brighton, H. (2003). Iterated Learning: a framework for
the emergence of language. Artificial Life, 9(4):371–386.
[49] Sperber, D. and Wilson, D. (1995) Relevance communication and cognition Blackwell
Pub. London.
[50] Steels, L. (1996) Emergent Adaptive Lexicons. In: Maes, P. (ed.) (1996) From Ani-
mals to Animats 4: Proceedings of the Fourth International Conference On Simulation
of Adaptive Behavior, The MIT Press, Cambridge Ma.
[51] Steels, L. (1996c) Perceptually Grounded Meaning Creation. In Tokoro, M., edi-
tor,Proceedings of the International Conference on Multi-Agent Systems, Cambridge,
MA, 1996. The MIT Press.
21
[52] Steels, L. (1997) The Synthetic Modeling of Language Origins. Evolution of Com-
munication, vol. 1, nr. 1, pp. 1-34, Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Company.
[53] Steels, L. (1998) The Origins of Ontologies and Communication Conventions in Multi-
Agent Systems. Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems, vol. 1, no. 1, Oct. 1998,
pp. 169194.
[54] Steels, L. (1998b) The origins of syntax in visually grounded robotic agents.. Artificial
Intelligence, 103:1-24 1998.
[55] Steels, L. (2000) Language as a complex adaptive system. Lecture Notes in Com-
puter Science. Parallel Problem Solving from Nature - PPSN-VI. Volume Editor(s) :
Schoenauer et. al., Springer-Verlag, Berlin.
[56] Steels, L. (2001) Language games for autonomous robots , IEEE Intelligent Systems
16 (5) (2001)
[57] Steels, L. (2003) Evolving grounded communication for robots. Trends in Cognitive
Science. Volume 7, Issue 7, July 2003 , pp. 308-312.
[58] Steels, L. (2004a) Constructivist Development of Grounded Construction Grammars
Scott, D., Daelemans, W. and Walker M. (eds) (2004) Proceedings Annual Meeting
Association for Computational Linguistic Conference. Barcelona. p. 9-19.
[59] Steels, L. (2005) What triggers the emergence of grammar? Cangelosi, A. and C.
Nehaniv (2005) (eds.) Proceedings of the Second International Symposium on the Emer-
gence and Evolution of Linguistic Communication. University of Herfortshire.
[60] Steels, L. and T. Belpaeme (2005) Coordinating Perceptually Grounded Categories
through Language. A Case Study for Colour. Behavioral and Brain Science. To appear.
[61] Steels, L. and McIntyre, A. (1999) Spatially Distributed Naming Games. In: Ad-
vances in Complex Systems, vol. 1, nr. 4, pp. 301-323, Paris: Hermes Science Publica-
tions.
[62] Steels, L. and P. Vogt (1997) Grounding adaptive language games in robotic agents. In
Harvey, P. and P. Husbands (eds.) (1997) Proceedings of the 4th European Conference
on Artificial Life 97.
[63] Szathmary, E. (2001) Origin of the Human Language Faculty: the Language Amoeba
Hypothesis”. In: Trabant, J. , and S. Ward, ed. (2001) New Essays on the Origins of
Language. Mouton de Gruyter.
[64] Talmy, L. (2000) Toward a Cognitive Semantics: Concept Structuring Systems (Lan-
guage, Speech, and Communication) The MIT Press, Cambridge Ma.
[65] Tomasello, M. (1999). The cultural origins of human cognition. Harvard University
Press, Cambridge, MA.
[66] Van Kemenade, A (1987) Syntactic Case and Morphological Case in the History of
English. Forist Publications, Dordrecht.
22
[67] Van Looveren, J. (1999) Multiple word naming games. In Proceedings of the 11th
Belgium-Netherlands Conference on Artificial Intelligence. Universiteit Maastricht,
Maastricht, the Netherlands, 1999.
[68] Vogt, P. and Coumans, H. (2003) Investigating social interaction strategies for boot-
strapping lexicon development Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation 6(1)
[69] Wagner, K., J.A. Reggia, J. Uriagereka, G.S. Wilkinson (2003) Progress in the Simu-
lation of Emergent Communication and Language. Adaptive Behavior. Volume 11 (1):
37-69.
[70] Webster, M. A. and Kay, P. (2005) Individual and population differences in focal
colors. In: The anthropology of color, ed. R. L. MacLaury, G. Paramei and D. Dedrick.
Benjamins.
[71] Weisbuch, G., G. Deffuant , F. Amblard and J-P Nadal (2003) Interacting Agents
and Continuous Opinions Dynamics. Santa Fe Institute Working Paper 01-11-072
[72] Werner, G. and M. Dyer (1991) ”Evolution of Communication in Artificial Organ-
isms”, in Langton, C. et al. (ed.) Artificial Life II. Addison-Wesley Pub. Co. Redwood
City, p. 659-687
23
